How did the former republics influence formation process of the new Russian social identity after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991?

Abstract

With the fall of the Soviet Union and break off its brother republics, the new Russian state was faced with a crisis of own identity. With scrapping off the communist past, the newly established government was in a search of an alternative definition of the reborn state. However, being previously defined by its borders, the new Russian state had to understand how to see itself concerning its new neighbours. Therefore, his research aims to explore the influence of the former Soviet republics on the social identity of the new Russian state. By applying the theoretical approach offered by Tajfel and Turner 1979, the paper looks at the process self-defining as an intergroup against the outgroup, in such case being Russia and the former republics. Using the methods of discourse analysis to deconstruct the events which were taking place from 1991 till 1997, the research looks at the popular TV show in Russia where the teams from post-Soviet states compete against each other in comedian style. As the findings show, with the change in the atmosphere dictated by the events, each team, including the Russian team, was adopting stereotypical images of the other. Using such tactics, each team was constructing their own intergroup with specific categories which in the process of the game were compared against the other groups. With the greater change in the atmosphere of the 1990s, the more intense was a process of comparison between the groups. Therefore, the final game showed that each republic tends to differentiate itself more, thus construction as Russian as well as its own identity.

Introduction
1.1 Research Background

The union of an unbreakable and free republics saw its end in summer 1991. With the speed of the events in 1991, the former united republics aimed to declare their new status, the status of independent states. Territorial division, defining new borders on the physical map, modifications of the political system were open to the eyes of observant. However, what was not so clear and problematic to explain was, as this paper argues, the formation of a new identity. To be more precise, the formation of a new Russian identity. Shared historical, cultural, linguistic and political backgrounds which were forming since the accumulation of communist status were torn apart and often denied by the former republics.

With the failure of Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s, also known as the New Thinking, the long pilling issues of the Soviet Union and heating conflicts on the borders as well as the resistance of the Baltic states to the communist rule led eventually to the dissolution of the system. As the layers of the communist structure were the main source of definition as for political as well as for social spheres of the Union, with that in ruins, the new Russian state approached a decade of the crisis of identity.

The question of the new Russian identity search and which one the state is aiming to construct was a topic of close attention. The scholarly realm more often tends to approach the crisis of Russian identity with the help of Westernist and Nativist approaches. The given theoretical frameworks rather help to understand and interpret the trajectory of foreign policy decision and self-definition in relation to the Western world. On the other hand, with a loss of a great share of territory, inhabited with various nationalities, the identity search of the new Russia has also been looked with a consideration of the post-Soviet space. More traditional political theories such as orientalism often were adopted to understand the relationships between Russia and the ex-republics. However, in both cases, the new Russian identity, as well as the role of the ex-Soviet republics in the process of identity-making, is rather looked from top to bottom, closely addressing the outside factors.

The structure which is more often analysed obscures the importance of the social construction which takes place under the discourse of the events in the 1990s. This research aims to bring to closer look the relationships between the Russian new neighbours on the Eurasian continent and their influence in the process of self-making. To be more precise, the influence

of the sovereign states in the Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Eastern European. The Baltic states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, are excluded in this research due to their post-Soviet relationships with Russia and clear approach to getting into the ‘Western club’, by becoming members of European Union and joining NATO alliance.

1.2. Aims and hypothesis

The presented research aims to discuss the social identity formation process of the new Russian state after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 by focusing on the role the ex- republics and to detect their influence on the Russian identity. The question is, thus, formulated as follows:

‘How did the former republics influence formation process of the new Russian social identity after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991?’

The main guiding approach used for this work is found in social identity theory (SIT), presented by Tajfel and Turner 1979. The theoretical framework of social identity theory (SIT) enables to blend the relationships between the former republics as between one another as well as with their former core. However, the relationships are looked through the peoples’ interactions. With a lack of sources used for self-identity, the interactions which take place among the people in a certain context help to understand how one group perceive itself against the other.

To unveil the influence of the relationships between the players, the main point of the analysis is a popular TV show, KVN, widely watched as in the Soviet Union as well in the ex-Soviet states. For this study and more accurate analysis, the data is collected exclusively from the final games played each year. The first episode starting in 1991 until 1997. This timeframe was selected with a purpose to eliminate the growing trend of identity modification in the Yeltsin’s office with the appointment of Vladimir Putin as Deputy Chief of Presidential Staff. With growing career successes of Vladimir Putin in the Russian government, many scholars point at the changing discourse of the Russian state, moving towards the establishment of the new social identity.

The research will divide these seven years of the new Russian state into three parts. The first two years of newly established Russia Federation, as well as independent existing former republics, were a time of liberal political reforms, welcoming of capitalist economic ideas and fall of Western isolation. While the first two years were a time of hope and bright future for Russia, the second period from 1993 till 1996 was signified with the State Duma election and rise of nativist and neo-liberal communist politics. With economic stagnation and growing poverty in Russia, the discourse which was changing according to the events brought a new wave self-identification. These four years were not only preoccupied with economic and political downfalls, but rather territorial division and security questions with the ex-republics also entered into daily agenda. Thus, modifying the relationships between the states, the process of social identification was influenced. The final two years of this analysis are associated with the second term of Boris Yeltsin. Second presidential elections, the losses in the Chechen War and quickly accumulating foreign debt signified the third and the last phase of Russian social identity. With all these events which were accompanying the Russian Federation constructed a different discourse which shaped the relationships with its former republics. All of the three periods are significant to the study of the influence of the ex-republics on the social identity of the Russian state. Each year shaping a discourse which later formulated the interactions between the states and identities.

Literature review

The role of the literature is to present the most common approaches and studies about the identity formation of Russia after the fall of the Union. With the fall of the communist structure, the scholarly realm focused on the phenomenon of the crisis of identity. With unclear self-identification, the crisis of Russian identity was studied through the Westernist and the Nativist approaches. However, studies of the identity search are not exclusively applied to Soviet successor state, rather the scholarly realm also overlooks at the newly independent countries which were re-establishing ‘themselves’. Therefore, this section is a collection of most relevant work on the study of the new Russian identity concerning the former republics.

2.1 Crisis of Identity

With the loss of its defining sources, including the former space of influence, the dominant ideology and international great power status, the new Russia at the beginning of 1990s entered into a period of an identity crisis. The crisis of identity was the transition period which occurred after unsuccessful Gorbachev’s reforms and before the new wave of identity process establishment under Putin’s work in the office. The failure to present coherent foreign policy under the New Thinking and inability to mobilise cultural identity, thus divided the nation’s citizens and made them unsure about their future (A. Tsygankov 2016, p. 26).

Whether being more certain about the newly independent states and their aspirations to construct an alternative identity, it is more difficult to understand how the new Russian state was searching for its identity. Dmitri Trenin 2001, for example, rather argues that ‘Russia, as a historically imperial and multi-ethnic state, is defined by its borders’ (p. 22). The borders, in this case, are the lost territory and the new states with a new history without Russia. With the loss of territory and the central system of self-definition, the new Russian state failed to fill the gap which occurred after the fall. Thus, Russia had to look for an alternative way of defining the self.

The Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union held together and controlled a vast number of territories with various ethnic associations. For reinforcement of the dominant identity, in which case is the Russian like any other imperial power used the policies of assimilation. Such a trend was used during the years of Empire and the communist system. Once being pushed by policies of Russification and the other by assimilation. After the fall of the system which sourced such policies and made up the discourse, the ex-republics looked forwards to find an alternative source for their collective identities which did not have any close ties with the Imperial and Soviet past. In the meantime, the Russian Federation was left in a search of a new identity, transiting through a crisis of self-finding.

Since this research aims to explore the social identity process of the Russian Federation in the 1990s, the term has to be defined. Davis et al. 2019 define identity as being a multifaced phenomenon which incorporates ‘individual, interpersonal, and social processes’ (p. 254). In his claim, identity is a process which is influence by the structure and the atmosphere of the events. On the other hand, some would use the concept of identity when talking to private ideas of who they are. Meanwhile, identity as ideas and categories would be shared among those who fit into criteria designed to differentiate themselves against the other. Consequently, helping to gain positive association and self-esteem as a comparison would be made in positive terms against the other, especially at the time when a group has been in a crisis of their own identity. Roxan Doty establishes that ‘identity is never a finished product; it is always in the process of being constructed and reconstructed’ (R. Doty cited in G. Smith et al. 1998, p. 3).

The reason why the 1990s was a difficult time for defining Russian identity, more importantly, social identity, was because the communist rule which replaced the old Tsarish system in 1917 shifted the paradigm of the Russian state. Scholars point that ‘after 1917, the Soviet identity was systematically imposed while the pre-Soviet one was deliberately destroyed. The last remnant of the Soviet identity is dying out, whereas the pre-Soviet identity has not been restored’ (Likhacheva et al. 2015, p. 4). With the loss of both paradigms and the inability to place a new system of justification, the new Russian state had to find an alternative source for defining self against the other.

2.2 Conventional approaches of Westernism and Nativism

With no clear identity, many scholars were keen to observe the process of identity-making of the Russian state. The direction which would be taken by the Russian state to define itself against the other was a contested topic among many scholars. The most common approach to the study of the development of the Soviet successor state is found in the Westernist and Nativist debate.

‘The Westernist and the Nativist are two different perspectives from which to approach Russia’ argued by Tsygankov (2014, p. 4). Using the Westernist and Nativist approaches, authors like Dmitry Trenin and Andrei Tsygankov and many others examine the foreign policy of the Russian state in its historical context, especially during the 1990s. Hence, breaking down the changes and continuity of the country’s foreign policy to analysis the construction of its identity.

Foreign policy formulation, in their claim, was a reflection of the national identity. Grounding their responses and decision towards one or another country, roots in the identity of a country. Previously being a rejection of the capitalist economic structure and democratic ideology, the era of the 20th century reflected the communist identity, to be clearer the perspective of being ‘unique’ as defined by the Nativists. On the other hand, the early 1990s were a reflection of the downfall of communist values and a strong desire to adopt Western identity. The Westernist proponents, like was Boris Yeltsin ‘saw the country as an organic part of Western civilization whose “genuine” Western identity had been hijacked by Bolsheviks and the Soviet system’ (Tsygankov 2016, p. 61).

Each approach holds a certain view of the Russian state. The Westerners, as addressed by Tsygankov 2014, argue that Russian institutions and the system which guide the state tend to be largely equal to those in the Western states. It is not how the foreign partners look at the successor state, rather this approach discusses how the people of Russia look at themselves in relation to the West. In the analysis of foreign policy, Tsygankov 2014 argues ‘Russians themselves sometimes hold views that largely correspond with the liberal Westernist perspective’ (ibid 2014, p. 4). Looking at the late 1980s, with the declaration of the end of the Cold War and fall of the German Wall in 1989 alongside the policy of ‘glasnost’, the foreign policy of Mikhail Gorbachev can be characterised as a reflection of Western identity. The post-communist period and the rise of liberal reformers like Boris Yeltsin, thus a continuation of Russian identity which mirrors its western neighbours. The economic strategy, for example, which was proposed in 1992 by Anatoly Chubais dismantled the old policies of industry nationalisation and state-control. Tsygankov 2014, thus points that the new Russian state was rather seeking to define itself with the closer association to the West rather than preserving its old communist ideas.

Meanwhile, ‘the Nativist perspective views Russia’s historical and cultural experience as principally distinct from that of Western nations’ (A. Tsygankov 2014, p. 5). ‘Russia has been a unique case since its appearance on the world’s map and cannot merely march in lockstep with the West’ (ibid, p. 5). It is the ‘unconscious Sovietism’ that survives in a large portion of the population after the fall of the Soviet Union, includes radical appeals to create an ‘unconventional Empire’, thus being different in its aspirations to the West (Likhacheva et al. 2015, p. 3). After the first two years of pro-liberal thinkers like Boris Yeltsin, the Russian system saw a rise in neo-communist figures like Gennady Zyuganov who was favoured by many of the Russian people. Placing the Russian Federation in the concept of being unique and different historically, many people, thus, appealed to an alternative party of G. Zyuganov. However, Likhacheva et al. 2015 rather state that Russian identity has a blurred definition as to whether being unique to itself or being a clear interpretation of European ideas and future, stating that ‘Russian national identity carries of an original culture, which nonetheless is European in nature…’ (Likhacheva et al. 2015, p. 4).

The Westernist and the Nativist debate presents some of the downfalls to the analysis of the social identity of Russia. The problem being is an overwhelming concentration on the relationships between the West and Russia. The social structure, economic and political institutions are overlooked in relation to the West, thus eliminating the importance of the ex- republics. Besides, the analysis of the Westernist and the Nativist debate in the context of the Russian identity formation is rather looked through outside layers, not looking at the interactions among the people. Therefore, not being efficient to explain the influence of the ex-republics on the social identity of the new Russian state.

2.3 The Newly Independent States: New post-Soviet outlook?

The first two sections of the literature review devote close attention to the Russian state. This research aims to address the importance of the newly independent state in the identity-making process. G. Smith et al. 1998 pointed that ‘following the break-up of the Soviet Union, one of the most urgent questions to emerge from the critical confusion was how the newly emerging polities would set about creating convincing identities for themselves and their citizens’ (p. ix). Therefore, this section discusses the existing work on the identity of the sovereign states which came into being after the fall of the Soviet system. This is important to look at the establishment of new identities in the ex-republics. With new categories of self-identification, the newly independent states were able to differentiate themselves against the successor Russian state.

Throughout many of the borderland states, notably in the Baltic states, Georgia and some other central Asian republics, the main institutions of Soviet power, the Communist Party, has been banned. Thus, in a number of the Borderlands states those political elites who had held positions of power within the Communist Party during the Soviet period have been subject to electoral humiliation and rejection. For those political elites who have survived most notably in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the only way to remain in power has been to distance themselves from the previous regime by switching to employing ethnic codes. Smith et al. 1998 points at the process of de- Sovietisation which took place across the new sovereign states (p. 14). De-Sovietisation, Smith et al 1998 presents, is a way which enables nationalising political elites to remove the symbols, political institutions and representatives of Soviet power from the social and political landscape. In return, the new national elite replaces them with new national symbols, political institutions and social practices to safeguard what is claimed as ‘the national interest’ against the colonial ‘other’’ (p. 14). The policies of deconstructing the Soviet discourse targeted communist nationalist policies which previously aimed to cover the national identities of the ex-republics. Thus, helping to establish an alternative explanation for national identity which was not a replication of the Soviet one.

In the study conducted by Smith et al., the authors were trying to follow the identity formation of the new republics which were created after the fall of the Soviet Union. As the schoolers were digging deeper into the history of Soviet time as well as bringing the past events of the Russian empire, they were rather looking at the formation of the new states and how the Soviet past was affecting the construction of their new selves. The past more often than never would influence the present. Thus, the Soviet past to more or less extends influences the identity formation of the sovereign states on the borders of the post-Soviet Union. Some would deny its past and continue to reject any associations, which in turn is also the influence of the past. Some would rather modify and adjust themselves acknowledging the past and present. Dmitry Trenin 201, for instance, instead of simply mentioning their rebirth and survival, points at the process of re-establishment. Those states became different, ‘with no direct experience of the Soviet Union…’ (p. 36).

Despite the challenges of a post-Soviet time of the territorial division which was taking place in all parts of the Union as well as the need to establish own economies which would not be directed from the top. ‘The new states have proved themselves viable…not a single country in the former Soviet territory has turned into a failed state’ (D. Trenin 2011, p. 82). Thus, the scholars presented the supporting evidence that showed that the new states were in a process of developing their own identities which allowed them to ‘create new national myths and write new suitable histories of their nations’ (Trenin 2011, p. 17).

However, the studies conducted on the identity formation of the newly independent states do not explain the construction of the new Russian identity. In addition, the methods implemented by the national government to reject the Soviet past does not mean that the Russian identity was constructed under rejection of its own legacy. Therefore, there is a need to study how the social identity of the Russian state concerning its former republics was constructed.

2.4 Orientalism: Russian and Soviet orient

The discussion of how the Russian Federation was establishing itself as a nation in relations to the Western partners showed rather a continuity of the long-lasting debate between the two schools of thought. On the other hand, the attention was given to scholars’ work in closely examining the formation of the identities in the ex-Soviet republics which genially were eager to disassociate themselves with the Soviet sources of identity. However, to understand the relationships between the new Russian state and the ex-republics, there is a need to approach such an area using international political theory. The relationships which were formed under the Russian Empire and the Soviet rule help to depict a change and continuity of influence of either the Russian state or the former republics. Therefore, this section of literature discusses the theory of orientalism in the context of Russian relationships with its former polities.

The reason being of including orientalist theory to the study of Russian identity was due to attention given to the relationship’s formation process. Russian Empire, later the Soviet Union is an empire like were the British or French. Whether is more difficult to define, the Soviet Union was also an empire due to its policies and methods of rule. ‘Elements of the empire are still visible — at home and abroad. Today’s Russian Federation is a neo-tsarist, mildly authoritarian polity’, argued by Trenin 2011 (p. 14). It not exclusively about the land and the resources which were in value of the colonisers. It is also social domination which enabled to define ‘us’ against ‘them’. For example, Anisimova 2017 brings to the attention relationships between the core, which is the Russian state, and the periphery, the Caucasus in her case. ‘The Caucasus is the setting that leads the Russian protagonist to confront existential questions and that turns into the perfect theatre for the exploration of the Russian self’ (I. Anisimova 2017, p. 6). This feature written in the text has shown that the Russian and its republics were never fully blended into one, thus the products like films and literature as well as cultural policies have always emphasized the difference, making the ex-republics ‘the Other’.

Irina Anisimova’s study of the post-Soviet orient presents an interesting insight. The literature which was produced during the 80s and 90s by L. Petrushevskaia and V. Makanin was used as a source for analysis. Pointed by scholar, the scenes were respectively set in Central Asia and the Caucasus, reflecting the trouble late Soviet and post-Soviet relationship between the centre and these regions. Like the Great European Empires were using the arts to morally downsize their colonial population, like were the soviet writers setting the atmosphere of ‘an exotic background’ of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In turn, such illustration would enhance the moral and social concerns of protagonists who belonged to the Russian intelligentsia. (I. Anisimova 2017, p. 3). ‘At the same time, the representation of Soviet ethnic republics was popularised in Soviet cinema by both Russian and non-Russian directors, influencing cultural attitudes’ (Ibid. 2017, p. 3). The films and literature were broadly popularised among the soviet citizens, perception of the regions was spread among the population. Thus, the orientalist theory applied to the context of the Russian and former republics relationships shows how the former played an important role in enhancing Imperial and Soviet identity. Therefore, acknowledging the past and former attitudes among the nation, the theory helps to broaden perspective about the influence of the former republics on the new Russian social identity.

Although the orientalism theory presented an important analysis of the relationships between the former republic and the Russian state in the context of the time and colonial atmosphere, the theory rather points the dominant relationships between the former republics and the new Russian state. However, this research rather aims to look at the social process to in the perspective of one dominating the other, rather being equal.

Methodology

Identity is not something given or remains untouched. ‘…identity is not some sort of independently existing reality outside of the individual, but that it is actively constructed by this individual’ (Versluys 2000, p. 91). This research aims to explore the influence of the ex-Soviet republics on the social identity of the new Russian state in the 1990s.

3.1 Research Method and Theory

The change in the relationships between the Russian Federation and the newly independent states has to be looked through the context of the events which accompanied the 1990s. Looking at the popular media programme in Russia helps to depict the formation of identity as outlined within the theoretical framework. The research uses the discourse analysis method to deconstruct the meanings behind each episode. More importantly, how the events change the meanings each group assign to either differentiate oneself against the other social group or intensify positive identity.

Discourses, as pointed by Weedon 1987, ‘are ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledge and the relationships between them’ (p. 108). Thus, the relationships between the actors and the constructed knowledge about one another present a certain discourse. As the interactions between the actors take place, a certain knowledge, or association, about one another, is put forward. Therefore, using the discourse analysis method, this research aims to deconstruct the association which are created as a result of social interactions.

The main guiding theoretical framework was found in the social identity theory outlined in the work of Tajfel and Turner 1979. Starting with the core idea of the theory, the social identity theory states ‘that individuals define their own identities concerning social groups and that such identifications work to protect and bolster self-identity’ (G. Islam 2014, p. 1781). Creation of social categories which determine whether a person belongs or falls out of the group enables a group of people, in this case, the Russian people, to define themselves ‘in terms of the defining characteristics of the category’ (M. Hogg, D. Terry and K. White 1995, p. 259). In the discourse of the events in the 1990s, the ex-republics and the new Russian state were drawing new association of each other, or categories which differentiated them. Once the groups with unique categories were created, according to Tajfel and Turner 1979, the groups tend to engage in a process of social comparison. In turn, social comparison enables the intergroup, in such case being the Russian people, insert a positive identity of the self.

As the events of 1990s were accompanied by territorial division, military conflicts and economic hardship, the theory suggests that ‘the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the individuals whom members of the opposite groups will behave towards each other’ (H. Tajfel and J. Turner 1986, p. 277). Therefore, the theoretical framework offered within the social identity theory is useful in analysing the influence of the ex-Soviet republics on the social identity of the new Russian state.

The social categories, used to differentiate the groups of people in a society, are the products of social interactions, the discursive method outlined above is used to depict how categories were created among the ex-Soviet state and the new Russian state. In turn, the deconstruction of such processes aims to look at how the social comparison, outline in the theory, made and enhanced self-identity. Following the process of deconstruction outline by Neuman 2008, representations of the discourse within the sources would be identified, acknowledging the possibility for censorship and subjective textual interpretation. Also, to depict a change in the construction of social categories which are informed by certain discourse, the sources have to be looked from various standing points.

3.2 Data Collection

This research collects data from episodes of the final KVN game from 1991 to 1997. KVN stands for ‘Club of Funny and the Inventive People’ is a humour TV show where teams from all post-Soviet space and modern Russia come together to present prepared sketches and answer to the questions given during the game. Being a popular TV programme of the time, a large share of the Russian population at was attracted to watch the episodes, thus making the analysis more representable. Besides, the game does not exclusive to the Russian population, rather the players also come from post-Soviet republics. As there is a good range of different teams which come from different states, the source helps to establish more evident correlations between the Russian teams and the ex-republics.

All of this material has been found in the official website of KVN club which stores all released episodes. Using the discourse analysis, which is best fitted for investigating media sources, discursive content of the episodes is identified and scrutinised under the interpretation of the theory of social identity. To depict the more accurate process of categorisation, discussed within the theory, the events, accompanying the final game are taken into consideration to depict any changes in the discourse of constructing social categories which enable to group the Russian people differently from the people of the ex- republics.

3.3 Limitations

Although the source includes a good number of different republics, it does not present all of them. The final game being a final point for all participant to win the cup, it is only four to three teams of the different state which make into the final. Therefore, the representation might not be so accurate, and the concluding evidence cannot be respectively applied to all ex-Soviet republics. As the Soviet Union incorporated a large share of different territories with different nationalities, to test a hypothesis, the more reflective source for analysis is required.

Analysis

The first years after the fall of the Union: 1991–1992 1991

The first episodes of the game were setting the atmosphere of saying a farewell to the Soviet Union. Signing the Belovezha Accords in December 1991 among all representatives of the republics, the accords ended the existence of the Soviet Union. With the recognition of the sovereignty of all Soviet republics and their administrative borders, the Soviet republics declared their official independence (Trenin 2011, p. 102). The Russian state under the presidency of pro-Western leader, Boris Yeltsin, adopted the liberal discourse, which dominated Russian politics in the 1990–2 period, and which represents a break with the Soviet and Tsarist past (Smith et al. 1998, p. 9).

What has been raised many times among all the teams from all playing republics in the final games in 1991 was ‘hope for the better future’ and ‘self-reliance’. However, despite the hope for a better future, each of the teams was referring to the future without the Russian influence.

It was a first year which was announced as ‘international year’. International in the sense that they now have seen a new distinction of ‘near abroad’. The ‘near abroad’ is a term which came into everyday life after the dissolution of the Union and establishment of the newly independent states. Near and far abroad. The two concepts which appeared in the Russian language. The near abroad included ex-Soviet republics while far abroad remained the Western world. Thus, making the ex-republics different from the Russian state. It was coined to define the ex-soviet territory which became independent from its core but remained under a certain influence. The change of language and terminology which was injected into the daily life of the Russian people was to create the differences, the various categories which would enable to say ‘they are they’ and ‘we are we’. We are similar but very different.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new Russian government created a regional intergovernmental organisation which would encourage the participation of the newly sovereign states. The organisation made as to the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS. With liberal ideas rotating in the Russian government, the union aimed to promote cooperation on economic, political and security concerns among the members. Such inspirations raised after the Soviet fall constructed a liberal discourse which was welcomed by ex-Soviet people. The members of the ex-republics were eager to acknowledge their independent status, more often referring during game stating that ‘we welcome the Union of Sovereign States’ or more often ‘as independent states’. Thus, the ex-republics were seeing themselves as separate from the Russian state. Such separation was enhancing the grouping process among the republics, thus creating a different social status and identity, contributing to the creation of Russian identity.

The first years were not only signified with the election of the first Russian president, but with ‘the reformers, such as Gennadi Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar, and Andrei Kozyrev, advocating for radical policies that they hoped would bring Russia in line with the politico-economic standards of Western countries within a limited period of time’ (Tsygankov 2014, p. 89). The poor economic condition inherited after the fall of the Union, paved the way for the adoption of radical economic reforms, also known as ‘the shock therapy’. These reforms, as advocated by the new government, enabled the Russian state to transition to a Western-style system (ibid 2014, p. 90). The economic changes which were occurring not only in Russia but also in other states of the former Soviet Union, sourced for creation of other social categories powered under the discourse of the first years of the Russian Federation. These categories were more often concerned with the failure of the Soviet system to create a coherent Union with a strong economy. The members of the Azerbaijan team, for example, referred to the legacy of Mikhail Gorbachev as ‘a big problem’ and ‘grand failure’.

Speaking of categories, it was interesting how the teams, the groups, were using the past. For example, the Uralsk team was referring to power competition between Gorbachev and Yeltsin as a ‘breakthrough of liberal ideas’ and ‘inability of the old system to sustain’. Interestingly, the teams were not speaking or addressing to its former allies as someone different rather as remaining comrades, especially evident in 1991 game. However, as time was passing, there was more distinction depicted. There was also more calling to the Russian people as ‘Soviet people’, for example ‘the Soviet surgeon, sportsmen and many other’. This signals how the Russians people were more often categorised according to their Soviet past, meanwhile, the teams of the former republics were less likely to do so.

1992

The episode of 1992 was marked with the erupted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was a frozen conflict on the border of the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the Union and the acquisition of sovereignty, the conflict between the two-state became heated. In the final game of 1992, the Armenian and Azerbaijani teams were the main players for the KVN trophy. The tensions between the two teams were addressed by the host. The Russian side was trying to declare its neutrality status in the conflict, thus constructing the positive identity of the self as not involving in the conflict. In turn, with the need to enhance their own social identity, it was more often that there would be a comparison against the Caucasian identity and the Russian identity made during the games. One of the jokes which were raised by the Armenian team was about the attitude which they felt from the Russians. Stating that the features which are predominated across various nationalities in the Transcaucasia, ‘for Russian people we are all the same’. This joke raises a point that the Russian people do not see any difference between nationalities in the Caucasus, downsizing their collective individuality and distinctiveness. Thus, comparing themselves again the other, especially when bringing to the attention the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The economic situation in Russia and across the former republic influenced the relationships between the actors. As was put forward initially, Yelstin’s government aimed to liberate most prices in the country, conducting privatization policies during 1992. However, what was happening as a result of such was not a free-market model of capitalism alike the Western models. Rather an oligarchical system (Tsygankov 2014, p. 90). The oligarchical system was raised due to failure of the privatisation reforms, actively promoted by the new government.

To distribute property quickly and to win over popular support for the Yeltsin’s coalition, the reformers including Anatoly Chubais, decided to rely mostly on the mechanism of free voucher privatization. Such a system was was earlier implemented in Czechoslovakia, which similar to the Russian state, was adopting the Western economic model. The Russian government believed that the open sale of state-owned assets, as opposed to the voucher program, would have likely resulted in the further concentration of ownership among the Russian mafia and the nomenklatura, which they sought to avoid. Nevertheless, contrary to the government’s expectations, a small group of business-orientated people managed to buy most of the assets. As a result, the ordinary citizens were forced to reply to the governmental support and provision, like were the Soviet people. Thus, the national industry was monopolised by a small group of people.

In addition, the liberalization of prices encouraged under the economic reforms signalled in hyperinflation and loss savings for members of the Soviet middle class. This, in turn, impacted on the standards of living which were declined dramatically over a very short period, most people found themselves impoverished (Tsygankov 2014, p. 90).

With years to come, the outlook of the audience was changing. It not related to the clothing they were wearing at that time, which, to point, was a mimicry of western fashion. This was more about their attitude and objects of reference they were using during the show. ‘El’tsin achieved greater acceptance from the population by restoring the imperial tricolour flag and the imperial two-headed eagle as the state emblem’ (Duncan 2005, p. 287). Thus, the flags of the Russian Federation were more often raised during the performance of the Russian team. Meanwhile, the audience of the ex-republics more often used the national flags which had no reference to the Soviet past or any association with Russia. The events of the 1990s, slowly changing the relationships between Russia and the former republics. Starting from more liberal discourse and unified attitude for a better future, the ex-republics were appealing to the Russian audience as being different. The members of the ex-republics were constructing different categories, which in turn categorised Russians outsiders. Thus, as social identity framework suggests, reinforcing group comparison. As the group comparison was taking place, the groups were building their identities.

The State Duma Elections and what was after 1993–1995

The downfall of the economy and growing unrest which was related to unsuccessful reforms of privatisation and market liberalisation in combination with the decision to enter the Chechen War in 1994, people of the ex-Soviet republics and the Russian citizens constructed a different discourse to that which occurred during the first years. Mid 1993 was also marked with the constitutional crisis which was triggered by the power struggle between the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, and the Russian parliament. The crisis resulted in the dissolution of the legislative system which was ended the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, later followed by a bombardment of the White House in Moscow. The dark time of the second period resulted in chaos within the new Russian state as well as in relationships with the former republics. As the events were changing atmosphere between the states, there were changes in how the Russian people were perceiving themselves against the people of ex-Soviet republics.

The episode of the final game in 1993 showed a growing attitude of differentiation. After the dissolution of the Union, the sense of ‘nostalgia’ and reference to the Soviet symbols was less evident. With years to come and the need to define itself against the other, thus creating categories under the discourse of the events, the first comparison was made against the Azerbaijan team. Under the new immigration regulations which were established after signing of creation of CIS, the people of the former republics were more often categorised as foreigners. People from all Soviet republics, thus, had to be registered upon their arrival in Russia. Despite the clear logic of the system outlined in the new legislative structure of Russia, the people who were previously associated as ‘brothers and sisters’ of the Soviet republics, were differentiated. With a need to acquire the registration lists, the people from the post-Soviet space, especially from the Transcaucasia, face greater difficulty than those from Eastern Europe. For Example, the members of Azerbaijan team pinpointed to the difference between them and the Russians created under such policy by joking that ‘it would be a super dream that when I am, the Azeri, in Moscow and no one can throw me out of this city’. The more difference between the people of the ex-republics and the Russian were put upfront. Thus, creating a sense of difference and defining oneself against the other. The whole point of bringing old friends in Russia that positively reflects Russians good identity.

The teams from ex-Soviet space, apart from rejecting and using in humiliating forms the symbols of the Soviet legacy, like was done by the Ukrainian team during the final game in 1994, were more often bringing to their exposure the national languages and items of their national costumes. The Ukrainian team was more often injecting its national language during the show to enhance the difference with Russia. The members of the Ukrainian team during song contest in 1993 episode referenced to the Russian people as ‘Moskoli’. The term entails a negative connotation when referring to the Russian people. Besides, a similar trend was noticed by many of the Caucasian teams, like were the Armenian and Azerbaijani. With the changes, social differentiation was more noticeable.

More often than at the beginning of 1991, the ex-Soviet republics were using the Soviet legacy in their jokes to show their clear rejection and disassociation. The teams of Azerbaijan corrected the words in a popular Russian song, signing rather that ‘it is a happiness for us to leave behind the Soviet rule and live without any rule’. Again, the ex-Soviet republics were constructing social categories which made them different. Different and non-relatable to the Soviet time and its successor state.

The State Duma Election in 1993 marked the growing downfall in popularity and support for Yeltsin’ policies. As the parliamentary elections showed, liberal parties were losing to those of nationalist orientation. As the geopolitical and economic situation was worsening, the opposition which included military industrialists, the army, security services, and economic managers with strong ties to the ex-Soviet republics challenged the liberal discourse of early years of the 1990s (Tsygankov 2014, p. 92). Thus, impacting the relationships between the ex-republics and the Russian Federation, making them more different from one another.

1994

It was a year when the fighting with Chechen separatists begun. It was a year of the First Chechen War. With the change of the environment, 1994 was a year where the teams of the KVN club were using much more reference to the differences in who they are against one another. Especially, the members of the Russian teams were seeking to group themselves differently to the rest of the players.

Such a trend started to grow since the dissolution of the Union, but with the events on the Eurasian continent, the pointing to the uniqueness of each group was made more visible. With entering the military conflict with one of the republics within the Russian Federation, there was a stronger need to differentiate the Russians against the other republics. Thus, the Russian teams and more often, the panel of judges were referring to themselves as ‘Rossiyane’. Such category was created to fit into a group which would be represented against all other republics and more often enhanced during the game. The changed which were happening at the time were shaping social relationships between the former republic and the new Russian state. Thus, changing influencing the creation of Russian social identity which would be different from its ex-republics.

1995

The following years were marked with political competition among the Russian leading political figures, especially Boris Yeltsin and Gennady Zyuganov. Apart from growing economic struggle s which exacerbated from the fall of the nationalised economy, the Russian state was failing to commit to the promised raised during the electoral campaign and fulfil the promises to its foreign partners, especially its Western friends.

The more jokes raised by all the teams about the Russian political life, the more present became a figure of Vladimir Zhirinovsky who became a leading opposition after the State Duma election in 1993 to Boris Yeltsin. He was seen as a contrasting figure to all democratisation process. In addition, his expressive nature and tone during his addresses to the audience was a good source for a comical reference by many of the teams.

The rise of neo-communist groups and anti-Western politician showed a change in the country’s discourse. With the decline of Yeltsin’s popularity and noticeable failure to rebuild the economy and pay for the foreign debt, the jokes reflected the dismantling of the pro-liberal atmosphere.

Aside from the growing military threat in Chechnya, with establish of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, the new issue was raised. The main being concerned with the status of Crimea. With the division of strategic assets, ‘the Russian state was seeking to secure its presence and control maintained over Sevastopol where the Russian fleet was based and minted its stationary troops. With signing CIS agreement as a ‘friendly’ replacement of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was continued to influence by the Russian politics. Seeking to win Ukraine’s agreement to give up the Soviet nuclear arsenal in its territory, Russia consented to officially guarantee Ukraine’s borders under the Tripartite Accords (Ukraine-Russia-the United States) of January 14, 1994, and the Budapest Declaration of December 5, 1994 (Trenin 2001, p. 165).

Still, it was only in August 1996 that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators agreed to establish a subcommittee on state borders. But even then, the Duma deputies continued to raise the issue of Sevastopol. Peaking of territorial division, which was taking place between Russia and Ukraine, the presenter of the game stated: ‘While Russia and Ukraine were deciding where Crimea belongs, the Sempheropol’s teams turn to the KVN club as their place of belonging’. With escalating relationships between Ukraine and Russia, the more distinction was made during the game by the teams.

The changed with occurred in the economic realm which prevailed in the discourse of the 1990s, ‘for most Russians economic and social rights definitely prevail over the political ones’ (Likhacheva etal. 2015, p. 5). Since the fall of the Soviet system which supplied its people with essential infrastructure and justification of the collective pathway, ‘concept of a state we must admit that it is very important role is to create a sphere for human interaction where smaller identities can be formed and to nudge people towards each other in order to make sure those threads start connecting them’ (Likhacheva etal. 2015, p. 5). Speaking of economic changes which became more significant in the lives of the Russian people, the Westernist model, which was adopted by President Yeltsin’s ministers, assumed that the reforms of privatization of the economy would turn the Russian pathway towards more democratic outlook (Duncan 2015). Russia itself became fractures economically, ideologically as well as politically. ‘The state has a negative image that is only becoming worse: endemic corruption, disrespect for human rights and widespread social vulnerability in place of a social safety net’ (Likhacheva etal. 2015, p. 4).

The second term: 1996–1997 1996

The president, Boris Yeltsin, announced his desire to seek for a second in the presidential election of 1996. Alongside the announcement, there growing discontent associated with his figure. The domestic disorder, the crush of the economy, failure to rebuild the social structure were all associated with Boris Yeltsin. Many of the ex-republic teams, for example, the Belorussian team, referred to his ‘alcoholic behaviour’ and ‘mumbling during conversations’.

Furthermore, Yeltsin’s aspiration to enter ‘the Western club’ was highly criticised. Like was raised by the Russian teams, the NATO expansion ‘was hard not to be noticed’. Military conflicts which erupted in the 1990s on the Russian periphery opened the new prospects for NATO expansion to the Russian borders. Many of the newly independent states, like was Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Ukraine, where all had the inspiration to enter into the western block, thus completely shifting their identity and being more positively associated than the Soviet successor state.

Speaking of the western role, ‘although the Western governments provided some substantial financial aid to Russia and were willing to cooperate in matters of security and arms control, these measures did not meet the existing, highly inflated expectations of Western assistance’ (Tsygankov 2014, p. 91). Therefore, the Russians were now increasingly blaming the West for the failed economic reforms’ (ibid 2014, p. 92).

The First Chechen War ended in 1996 signing a peace agreement which devoted some autonomy to the Chechen republic in the Russian Federation. However, the end of the war did not mean that perception of the people from the Caucasus was improved. There have been more distinctions made between the Russian and the Caucasians group to enhance its own identity. More often regarding the national music and language specifics. The differences which were seen in the interpretation of language and usage of traditional clothing has been used rather to emphasis the differences in a comic form.

The portray of the Caucasian nationalities in a negative form was raised by the Russian panel of judges. At the end of the game in 1996, a judge referred to the departure of the Caucasian team as an act of ‘liberation from criminality as that their city can be sleeping in peace now’ This can be interpreted that the Caucasian national have rather criminal behaviour which is feared among the Russians while they are there. This is a negative representation taken by the Russian audience in the ceremony hall as well as the TV audience.

1997

As the tension with Ukraine grew stronger on the topic of military division and designation of military significant territories, the final game of 1997 represented the final change in the discourse of creating social categories. It was inevitable that the growing problems would create the two socially distinct group, which tend to more often differentiate themselves against the other, compare and enhance own positive self-identity.

The dispute with Ukraine was resolved in 1997 after signing the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet. The treaties which were signed by the two countries established two separate and self- independent national fleets, which between them divided the armaments and the bases which were key reasons for the dispute. The Russian team used the event during when making a joke about the Ukrainian people, by sarcastically calling the Ukrainian fleet ‘independent’.

The events which were shaping the discourses under which the social categorisation was created, facilitated strong disassociation of the new Russian state with its former republics, thus creating its new social identity.

What has been more noticeable since 1991, there has been a distinction made not only against the Russian people but among the republics. Using the stereotypical references, such as items of clothing to accents, the teams were making a difference among themselves. At the time, it was displaying the members of the Armenian team who in a comical form were using items of each nationality: the Jewish, the Caucasia, and the Ukrainian. To repentance the social differences between them. The same pattern and the same method were used by the Armenia team which used the stereotypical images of different nationalities to distinguish themselves.

Conclusion

Identity is not something given or remains untouched. ‘…identity is not some sort of independently existing reality outside of the individual, but that it is actively constructed by this individual’ (Versluys 2000, p. 91). The social identity of the new Russian state is a subject of continued change and modification. Whether being previously sourced by the powerful ideological structure of the communist state or by the global power status in the international relations, the period of 1990s presented alternative source for defining the social identity of the Russian state.

Looking at the episodes of the final games of a popular comedy show in Russia and across the ex-Soviet republics, the social identity of the Russian state as was informed by the social identity theory was influenced by the interactions with its former republics. The games which were played throughout the period of seven years constructed different discourses which were used as a source for social categorisation, association and differentiation as among the ex-republics as well as the new Russian state.

The first years representing a more liberal approach towards the events and overall hope for a better future. The teams were not so eager to categorise themselves as being different or present much of comparison against one another group. Rather, with the years of economic downfall which occurred in all post-Soviet space and eruption of many conflicts on the borders, the Russian people were more presented as being different. The teams of the new sovereign states constructed social categories which were closely tied to the atmosphere of the events. Such categories were used to rather enhance the social identity of the ex-republic by picking on the downfalls of the new system and turned into jokes, thus positively enhancing their social identity. On the other hand, the same trend was depicted when the Russian team was presented their plays and jokes. More importantly, the panel of judges and the TV host, all represented the Russian side, were using the methods to differentiate them against the members of the ex-republics. The social identity theory which was used to analyse the events and the discourse behind the creation of the social categories, thus enable to support the research claim.

With more problems being exposed to the people, the often the teams were eager to compare themselves against the other. Whether being in case of the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, the First Chechen War or the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, the more severe the events, the more profound the comparison between the groups was taking place. One of the key factors uncovered by discourse analysis was that the former republics influenced the formation of the social identity of the new Russian state after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, what is also important to acknowledge is that the influence in constructing social identity is mutual rather than unshared.

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